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The Security Council (SC) is the organ of the United Nations Organization (UN) with 
"the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security", according to 
article 24 of the UN Charter. Member states of the UN explicitly recognize their obligation to 
implement SC resolutions, as stated in article 25: "The Members of the United Nations agree to 
accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present 
Charter". The Security Council is composed of five permanent members (the People's Republic 
of China, Frat:Ice, Russi~ the United Kingdom and the United States) with veto power over any 
resolution, and ten temporary members, which are elected for two-year terms by the United 
Nations General Assembly and have no veto power .. However, the performance of the SecuritY 
Council is weak mainly because of the veto power and the non-representation of the world 
population. Indeed, the context has dramatically changed since the creation of the United 
Nations Organization in 1945: at that time, the 5 permanent members (P-5) represented more 
than 50% of the world population, whereas they represented only 30% in 2006. A reform of the 
Security Council is therefore necessary and has to cope with several challenges: legitimacy, 
representation and effectiveness. How can we create a new system which would be more 
representative of world demography, economic powers, and geographical diversity at the same 
time? Above all, how can we avoid endless blockades because of the veto ,power? In a nutshell, 
how can one fmd a reasonable balance between collective security and state self-interests, in 
particular those of the P-5? 
Firstly, one could argue that the permanent-members veto should be replaced with a 
"double-majority" voting method (a majority both of all, the members and of the permanent 
members), to make the Security Council more effective. According to article 2 of the UN 
Charter, "The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its 
Members". However, article.27 specifies that "Decisions of the Security Council on all other 
matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of 
the permanent members". Then why do the P-5 have more privileges through veto power than 
any other member state? When the United Nations was created at the end of World War 11, the 
Allies placed themselves at the center of a collective security system established to prevent 
another war (Krasno, 2006: 93). Yet, the present system can be criticized, precisely because it is 
far from clear how it can prevent war. In fact, this system leaves a permanent member free to 
wage war on any country without being punished because it has a veto power. For instance, the 
United States started to make war on Iraq in 2003 without authorization of the UN. Thus, the 
veto power does not prevent another war, but only a war supported by the UN against one of the 
P-5. A permanent member can put its veto against any resolution that affects its self-interests but 
has nothing to do with its national security, which is even worse. For instance, the recently 
approved Security Council resolution to send a 26,000-strong peacekeeping force to Darfur 
(BBC News, 3 October 2007) had been vetoed many times by China in the past. That is why the 
veto power should be eliminated. Nevertheless, the amendment process set out in the UN Charter 
requires the concurrence of the five permanent members, as well as the 2/3 of the General 
Assembly, for any amendment of the Charter, including a change in the structure of the Council 
(Weiss,2005: 14). Practically speaking, therefore, none of the P-5 would approve any measure that 
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would remove its power to veto SC resolutions. As a result, any se reform will have to maintain 
the privileged status of the P-5. 
As earlier mentioned, the solution could consist .in replacing the permanent-member veto 
with a "double-majority", as Keith L. Sellen suggests (Sellen, 1992 : 187-192). "This voting 
method would require the concurrence of a majority of all members as well as a majority of the 
permanent members, before a Security Council resolution passes". Indeed, this system enables to 
maintain the privileged status of the P-5 (the independent concurrence by a majority of the 
permanent members is necessary) without maintaining the power to block unilaterally the 
passing of a resolution. One may claim that this reform could make the Security Council more 
effective and authoritative. Keith L. Sellen even argues that eliminating the veto is in the United 
States' best interests, because United States security improves as international security improves. 
Furthermore, "To say that United States national security improves as international security 
improves is to say that security is indivisible. Indivisibility means that a security threat anywhere 
is a security threat· everywhere and that one cannot classify any threat as purely national or 
international. This is true because our world is ever-shrinking" (Sellen, 1992 : 191). This 
argument appears relevant and realistic when we consider that the .international community is 
getting increasingly closer through improved communications, increased economic 
interdependence, increased reliance on collective security, integration of ideas, and growing 
membership in international organizations. Yet, it remains to be seen whether such an argument 
will convince the P-5 to accept the rather symbolic and more collective privileged status 
proposed by the advocates of the "double majority" voting system and finally forego their real, 
individual and unilateral veto power! 
Secondly, to make the Security Council·more representative, the number of permanent 
and non-permanent members should be increased, as model A of the High-level Panel suggests. 
When the United Nations was created at the end of World War 11, there were fifty-one members. 
Today it consists of 191 member states, and the balance of military and economic power in the 
world has changed significantly (Krasno, 2006 : 94-96). Moreover, the demographic distribution 
has dramatically changed since the creation of the United Nations: at that time, the 5 permanent 
members (P-5) represented the majority of the world population, while they represented only 
30% in 2006, according to the United Nations Department of EcOnomic and Social Affairs -
Population Division. Consequently, it is necessary to expand again the number of countries on 
the Council to. reflect the increased membership in the UN. Yet, the challenge is to rebalance the 
Security Council by taking into account the current world demographic, economic and 
geographic distribution, as proposed by Model A of the High-level Panel in 2004. However, the 
individual veto power of each of the P-5 should not be retained, as the model suggests, but 
replaced with a kind of joint privileged status of the P-5, as earlier argued. Model A proposes to 
create six new permanent seats, without privileged status, and three new non-permanents (elected 
for a two-year term, renewable). This would bring the total membership of the Security Council 
to twenty-four (from the original 11 and the present 15 members). Weiss et al. explain that with 
the new model, Africa would receive two permanent seats; AsialPacific would receive two new 
permanent and three new non-permanent seats; Europe would receive one new permanent and 
two non-permanent seats; the Americas would receive one new permanent and four non-
permanent seats (Weiss, 2007: 113-114). Thus, contrary to the current uneven distribution of the 
15 members, each region would have six representatives. 
Under the new system, we could have, for instance, South Africa and Nigeria or Egypt as 
permanent representatives for Africa in the Security Council, because of the size of the 
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population, resources or level of development of these countries. Similarly, we could have the 
United States and Brazil as permanent members representing the Americas. Germany could be 
the third West European permanent member of the Security Council with France and the United 
Kingdom. India and Japan could be the new permanent representatives for Asia, joining China, 
while Russia, because of its history and geography as a Eurasian power, could presumably 
represent both continents. Eventually, the new non-permanent members elected by the General 
Assembly would also make .the Security Council more representative, and thus make the 
resolutions more legitimate .. 
However, one can contest the strict equality of seats between each region proposed by the 
High-level Panel in this model A. Ind~ each region would have six representatives, although 
they do not each represent 1/6 of the world population. For instance, AsialPacific is almost as 
rich as Europe when we look at the GDP o( Germany, France, UK, Italy, and Spain compared to 
the GDP of Japan, China, Russia and India according to the IMF; yet, about 4 billions people live 
in the AsialPacific region against only about 731 millions in Europe in 2007, according to the 
INED. Despite this demographic ,contrast (Asia is alinost six times more populated than 
Europe), both regions would have six representatives in this model A. 
In conclusion, the Security Council reform should take place in two steps. First, the 
permanent-member veto should ideally be replaced with a "double-majority" to eliminate the 
possibility of a unilateral blockade of resolutions while maintaining the privileged status of the 
P-5~ Because we have to keep in mind that any reform will have to be accepted by every 
permanent member of the Security Council, as it is written in the Charter. Second, the number of 
permanent and non-permanent members should be increased, as model A of the High-level Panel 
suggests, and only the current P-5 will have a privileged status through the "double-majority" 
voting method. These two steps are indispensable conditions to make the Security Council 
resolutions de facto more effective, more authoritative and more legitimate. 
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